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Abstract. Honeypots are computers specifically deployed to be a resource that 
is expected to be attacked or compromised.  While the attacker is distracted 
with the decoy computer system we learn about the attacker and their methods 
of attack.  From the information gained about the attacks we can then review 
and harden out security systems.  Compared to an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) which may trigger false positives, we take the standpoint that nobody 
ought to be interacting with the decoy computer; therefore we regard all 
interactions to be of value and worth investigation.  A sample of honeypots are 
evaluated and one selected to collect attacks. The captured attacks reveal the 
source IP address of the attacker and the service port under attack.   Attacks 
where the exploit attempts to deploy a binary can capture the code, and 
automatically submit it for analysis to sandboxes such as VirusTotal.  
Keywords: Honeypots · Security · Intrusion Detection 
1 Introduction 
As a security monitor, Spitzner [1] gives the definition “a honeypot is an information 
system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource”.  A 
honeypot is a tool that does not have any authorised use, so any interaction is deemed 
to be of malicious intent.   
We are familiar with firewalls and Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
(IDPS) as methods of network defence; however a honeypot offers a different 
approach.  Kaur, Malhotra and Singh [2] argue that firewalls logging all traffic would 
collect an overwhelming amount of information that an administrator would find 
prohibitive to analyse; a honeypot however would only log attacks to a host, Joshi & 
Sardana [3] state that the small data sets are easier to manage and analyse.   
 
Their work also argues that Intrusion Detection is not a definitive security solution, as 
IDPS have high occurrences of false positive alerts requiring extensive tuning of the 
IDPS.  Similarly undetected intrusions (false negatives) also occur when malicious 
activity is not detected as a signature of the malware available to identify yet 
unknown or novel threats.  From the viewpoint that a honeypot does not advertise any 
resources for regular use, any interaction with the honeypot is assumed to be an 
intrusion and worthy of further investigation.  A honeypot can be used to check if 
intruders are rattling your door locks to test your home security, and the logging is 
analogous to the use of wet cement for detecting footprints. 
2 Background 
The concept of deceiving an attacker as a network security method has origins with 
the work documented of Cliff Stoll in 1986 [4] where he discovered an attacker had 
infiltrated the systems at Lawrence Berkeley Lab where Stoll was an astronomer.  
Rather than locking the attacker out of the system, Stoll decided to allow the attacker 
to stay on the system enabling Stoll to covertly learn more about the attacker and his 
techniques.   
Where Stoll looked to track a specific user, in 1990, Bill Cheswick [5] intentionally 
built a system to be attacked.  Cheswick created a ‘Jail’ that presented a contained 
environment to the attacker and appeared to include vulnerabilities that allowed him 
to study threats and how they were compromised.  With his system in place, 
Cheswick’s work describes how it was possible to monitor a user’s techniques as they 
infiltrated system vulnerabilities and gained control. 
The idea of emulating system vulnerabilities was developed in 1997 by Fred Cohen 
with his Deception Toolkit (DTK) [6], regarded as the first publically available 
honeypot that could be downloaded and deployed on one’s own systems.  As well as 
logging the attacker’s interactions, the DTK was designed to deceive and 
psychologically confuse them.  One method was actually to use port 365 as a 
deception port; suggesting attackers recognise this port was in use, and therefore 
avoid attacking that system, or utilised as a double-bluff and advertise this port on a 
production system. 
The term honeypot was first used by Lance Spitzner in 1999 [7] in the series of papers 
for the Honeynet project, ‘Know your Enemy’ asserted that based on the knowledge 
you gain discovering what attackers are looking for and their tools, this knowledge 
can be used to secure and protect your systems.  The work of the Honeynet project 
established awareness and value of honeypot systems.  Spitzner distinguished 
different interaction types of honeypots, High-interaction and Low-interaction.  High-
interaction honeypots offer a vulnerable real operating system allowing an attacker or 
worm to interact with the system, however all interactions are captured for analysis 
and can be used to detect zero-day attacks [8].  However high-interaction honeypots 
need a lot of monitoring and carry the risk that they can be compromised.  Low-
interaction honeypots simply look to emulate some of the services to be attacked.  
This is a simpler system to create, requiring less code to create the honeypot.  
However as a subset of services are emulated some responses or lack of them may 
help the attacker determine that a fake system is being attacked rather than a full 
system.  This absence of a full operating system however reduces the risk that that 
honeypot system can be compromised.  Spitzner also characterises different ways to 
deploy a honeypot, research and production.  In a research environment; typically 
operated by anti-malware research and government organisations, methods of 
unauthorised access being employed by the hacker community can be gathered to 
gain knowledge of new attacks, leading to developments to defend against those 
attacks.  Production honeypots are located alongside other servers on a production 
network to increase the security monitoring within the network.  Generally production 
honeypots are low-interaction, accordingly capturing limited information compared to 
a research honeypot. 
In the 2000s, network worms such as Code Red began to proliferate across the 
Internet, honeypots were an effective mechanism to capture the works and allow their 
attack to be analysed. By the mid-2000s the value of honeypots is becoming 
recognised, Provos & Holz [9] advocate virtual honeypots, allowing multiple 
honeypots to be deployed on a single system.  This virtual strategy provides a more 
efficient method to deploy a collection of honeypot systems.  If a virtual honeypot 
were compromised it could be restored efficiently.  
Many different honeypot tools and services have been listed by the Honeynet project 
[10], the research aims to evaluate a range of honeypot solutions and to determine the 
most suitable candidate to perform attack monitoring. 
3 Methodology 
There are two themes to the collection of data about honeypots in this study, first is an 
evaluation of available honeypot systems to identify an appropriate product to 
perform the data collection for the second theme where we analyse the information 
collected by a suitable honeypot system. 
3.1 Production Honeypot Products 
Over the research period a variety of honeypot programs have been evaluated, some 
are Microsoft Windows based, while others run on a Linux distribution. Where a 
Linux distribution is used, the common base is Ubuntu 12.04. The Honeypot systems 
were given an appraisal on several criteria, such as the simplicity deploy, and the 
information from attacks reported. 
BackOfficer Friendly. (BOF) is a simple Windows program dating from 1999, 
available from http://www.guardiansofjustice.com/diablo/Frames/Fileutil.htm. BOF 
was one of the first programs to give alerts when the system was probed for open 
ports. Basic replies to connections are returned, however it does provide a simple 
demonstration to determine how often a system is probed for intrusion.  
 
Fig. 1. Screen Display from BackOfficer Friendly 
While the live output of BOF alerts are displayed (Fig. 1) this would require the 
operator to constantly monitor the display, more beneficial is the log output Fig. 2 
which can be used to review attacks made onto the system. 
 Fig. 2. Log obtained from BackOfficer Friendly 
HoneyBOT. is a commercial Windows product; however an academic version is 
available for the evaluation period.  Simple to deploy and initially detects at lot of 
background noise traffic, however the ports commonly seen on a network can be 
turned off, leaving just the unusual ports to be monitored for unusual activity.  Fig. 3 
demonstrates the information captured by HoneyBOT. 
 
Fig. 3. Screen display from HoneyBOT 
Nepenthes.  Turning to Linux distributions for honeypots, Provos & Holz, [9] suggest 
Nepenthes as a system to install as a virtual honeypot . Installation is possible by 
downloading and compiling the source code, however deployment packages are 
available to acquire the software.  Unlike the previous Windows example, there is no 
graphical output to monitor attacks made onto the honeypot.  Attack data is collected 
in a series of log files, Fig. 4 shows an example from nepenthes.log ; of significance 
are events where a TCP connection is accepted.  These lines can be parsed at the 
command line and used to analyse the attack, better reports require the data to be 
exported into a spreadsheet for manipulation.   
Nepenthes, however does more than just log the attempts to connect to the honeypot, 
it is able to imitate some of the operating system commands, and in the occurrence of 
an intrusion attempting to deploy malware, the executable code is captured.  Captured 
code can be submitted to a sandbox service to analyse the malware.   
 
Fig. 4. Output from Nepenthes.Log file 
Dionaea. Released as the successor to Nepenthes, however the author’s experience of 
the download, compilation and installation cycle has found this Dionaea to be less 
straightforward and ultimately less successful than the previously tested honeypot 
solutions.  Work by Andy Smith [11] on automating this process made getting a 
Dionaea honeypot working much more efficiently.  Once running, Dionaea collects 
attack information into logfiles and a SQLite database that requires further inspection 
to understand the attacks collected by the system.   
 Fig. 5. DionaeaFR Graphical Interface 
Python scripts have been developed to gain graphical representations of the data from 
the command line, however additional extensions to Dionaea have provided a 
graphical front end to enable an operator to get an overview of attacks on the system, 
Fig. 5 illustrates some of information available.  Recently a project from 
ThreatStream, has introduced Modern Honey Network [12] as a honeypot 
management system to assist in the deployment of honeypots.  Dionaea is just one of 
several honeypots that MHN allows a user to deploy.  
Kippo. Many intrusions look to take remote control of the attacked system via the 
Secure Shell command interface.  Kippo is a medium interaction honeypot and 
concentrates on emulating the SSH interface to a higher level of sophistication than 
Dionaea offers.  Kippo is included as part of the HoneyDrive virtual appliance, that 
also includes Kippo-Graph [13] scripts allow the visual display of the data collected 
by Kippo.  For example Fig. 6 shows the attempted username / password 
combinations are captured, and Fig. 7 utilises a Geographical mapping of source IP 
address to locate the origin of an attack.  
 Fig. 6. Kippo-Graph visualisation of collected username / password combinations 
 
Fig. 7. Kippo-Graph Geo IP representation of source address of attacks 
During the trial, the majority of attacks are reported as originating from China and 
Japan. 
Evaluation. The HoneyDrive distribution gives a rapid method to begin collecting 
attack data and easy to understand graphical display, however for this study, the MHN 
deployment of Dionaea was selected to collect attack data as this offered simpler 
access to the attack data.  
3.2 Attack data collection 
The honeypot experimental system was created on a virtual installation of Ubuntu 
12.04 under VMware Workstation with a bridged network configuration allowing the 
virtual machine to be addressed on the network.   After installation of Ubuntu, the 
Modern Honey Network –11-- platform was installed and configured following 
default settings.  The honeypot system was then connected to a DMZ arm of the 
firewall and configured with a public address.  Once the MHN platform was running, 
it offers a choice of scripts to deploy under the MHN platform.  A Dionaea honeypot 
[14] was selected and the command generated was executed on the Ubuntu command 
line.  
This initiates the installation of a Dionaea honeypot.   Once a honeypot is deployed, 
there is a wait to see when an attack is detected, although an interaction can be forced 
with an nmap [15] scan against the IP address of the MHN system.  When connected 
to a public IP address the first attack can come in minutes after deployment.  
 
Fig. 8. Live map of attacks 
MHN offers a map representation of live attacks, see Fig. 8 for an example, an 
interesting graphical overview of the attacks being logged by the honeypot, however 
the database of the attack information can be extracted for deeper analysis.  
Additionally if you have a VirusTotal account, the Dionaea configuration can be 
updated with a suitable API Key and captured malware can be automatically directed 
to VirusTotal for analysis. 
For the data analysis, the R statistical programing language [16] with the R-Studio 
[17] interface was installed.  R is a free system allowing the user to write scripts to 
analyse the data.  The data from MHN was exported via FTP to the R workstation for 
analysis.  Scripts were written to remove unrequired information, and manipulate the 
timestamp fields by reformatting strings to date-time objects. 
Among the fields available for analysis were: timestamp, source IP address and 
destination port.  R scripts were developed to summarise the data and display bar 
charts. 
4 Data Results 
4.1 A. Source IP Address 
Fig. 9 shows that over the period of the experiment, the IP Address 188.165.238.186 
attacked the DMZ honeypot 13708 times. This is noteworthy as the next most 
frequent source IP addresses generated around 500 attacks.  The count of attacks was 
almost 30 times greater than the average number of attacks for a typical address in the 
remaining 19 of the top 20. 
 
Fig. 9. Analysis of Source Address 
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4.2 Destination Port 
 
Fig. 10. Analysis of top 20 Destination Ports 
Fig. 10 shows the destination port of attacks over the period of the experiment, 
notably Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) port 5060 attracted a relatively large number 
of attacks compared against other attacks looking for vulnerabilities in Microsoft 
Directory Services (445) SSH Remote Login Protocol (22) and Telnet (23). 
 
Fig. 11. Analysis data timestamp 
4.3 Timestamp 
Fig. 11 shows an average of around 500 attacks per day, however there is a distinct 
peak around 18th and 19th November 2014.   
5 Data Analysis 
The honeypot was connected to a public facing IP address and gathered a lot of 
unsolicited interest from remote devices. Regarding the number of attacks per day, we 
can establish a baseline of the number of expected attacks, and therefore be aware 
when this threshold is exceeded would statistically indicate a more persistent stream 
of attacks.  For this honeypot experiment number of attacks per day ( n=49) averaged 
484 (157) in the experiment period 28th October to 15 December 2014.  This 
implies that the mean of the population of attacks onto experimental honeypot, with 
95% confidence, is in the interval of 484 ±(1.96 x 157), which is from 176 to 792.  
This would suggest a exceeding a threshold of around 800 attacks per day would 
indicate extraordinary activity and merit further investigation. 
The graphs indicate where peaks in the data occur, when regarding the results of 
timestamp, source and destination together we can establish that between the 18th and 
19th November 2014, IP address 188.165.238.186 generated over 14,000 attacks on 
port 5060.  This suggests a sustained attack against Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), a 
protocol for handling telephone calls over an IP network.  Our organisation currently 
does not use SIP, so this traffic would be denied at the firewall, however the 
awareness that SIP vulnerabilities are actively sought [18] would inform the network 
manager to harden any SIP services that may be installed in future. 
 
6 Summary and Conclusion  
There are many varieties of honeypot deployments, and we have established that an 
implementation of Dionaea allowed the collection of a rich set of attack data. Other 
well established honeypots from the Honeynet projects page need to be examined for 
comparison, during the period of the study extra honeypot features became available, 
such as Splunk in MHN and Kibana for Kippo. 
The honeypot deployment only offers limited vision of attacks to its IP address rather 
than the whole sub-network.  Nevertheless the honeypot indicated the number of 
attacks a public facing IP address attracts, and emphasises the need for security on 
these systems.   Evidence specifying the source of threats and how they attempt to 
infiltrate the system provide valuable information to the network manager, who 
should act on this information to harden their security. 
This experiment suggests work to install R on the same machine as the MHN 
deployment, removing the delay in transferring the attack data to an analysis system 
therefore allowing timelier in depth analysis of the attack data. 
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